BSL poetry and Quantum Mechanics

This came out from conversation with Alex Arteaga from the Collegium for the Advanced Study of Picture Act and Embodiment at the Humboldt University, Berlin, although he is currently visiting Swarthmore College, PA, where I am. (You can find out more about him at http://www.hzt-berlin.de/?z=3&p=22&lan=en)

Alex has been thinking a lot about embodiment and language and has come up with two useful ideas of ‘container’ and ‘contigency’ to understand it.  We think his ideas can go a long way to help us think about sign language poetry.  I won’t go into the details here, because they are his ideas and I would almost certainly get them wrong anyway.  To know more, you can follow his work.  But the key point as I understand him is that the body doesn’t contain language, but rather it is a recursively creative part of it, so that body and language work together to contain the meaning they produce.  We can see the body as an action and/or an actor (which is linked to Josey Foo’s ideas – see my piece on her poetry collection The Lily Lilies).   

Although language is not contained in the body, the body’s actions create one part of the sense that interacts with the bodily perception and understanding of the world.  The whole process is recursive: our understanding of the world is constructed by our perception and it constructs our perception.  We can say, then, that this process is working when a poet performs BSL poetry, and it is constantly mediated by the signer’s audience who understand what the poet is signing.

We used Richard Carter’s Cochlear Implant to explore Alex’s way of thinking about embodied language (available at the BSL poetry anthology website  www.bristol.ac.uk/bslpoetryanthology). 

The body is not a container for the language, but words can be seen as the containers for meaning. Containers are enclosed, so a word - or sign - is a container of fixed meaning. In BSL that container is an established vocabulary sign.  Sure, established signs aren’t entirely enclosed and you couldn’t possibly say they have a firmly fixed meaning but it is a pretty good approximation.  The sign COCHLEAR-IMPLANT is a good container.  Like any good container it has meaningful lines that create a closure and give it form. In this case the meaningful lines are the four parameters of the sign – the handshape, the location, orientation and movement – and these construct the form that holds the meaning.When Richard signs COCHLEAR-IMPLANT he uses the clawed 3 handshape moving to contact at the fingertips above the ear. 

This is followed by a small whole-entity classifier for the location of the cochlear implant in the box. It has the same handshape, maintaining the link with the object, but also is a legitimate handshape for representing a small object.  The lines around the container are fading, though, because the location and even the orientation of the sign COCHLEAR-IMPLANT have gone. Although the hand refers to the cohclear implant in the box, the head, face and body are those of the character looking down at it.

 Then he shifts role and ‘becomes’ the cochlear implant by taking on its character, so that his hands, body and eyes become those of the cochlear implant. At this stage, the hands still have the same clawed 3 handshape, maintaining a shred of that original container. 

The last shred of the container fades away as the fingers wiggle and beckon enticingly, but the face and body that we have recently come to associate with the handshape remain.

The human hand reaches down to pick up the cochlear implant and Richard as the poet-performer places his hand over his whole face to grab it.  Now the hand is the deaf human’s hand in the story and the head and face have become the entire cochlear implant. We know this because of the thread of the story and because of the position of the face and body that was set up when the cochlear implant was first personified.

All this meaning comes as a result of contingency, not container. These signs have no container.  They are not bounded by meaningful lines as they merge and blend with each other.  Each subsequent sign is a choice that happens based on parts of what has come before, and has the potential to generate the meaning we give it because something has occurred previously.  What we see as the cochlear implant’s face and hands was set up by the containered sign COCHLEAR-IMPLANT. Thus, when we come to understand sign language poetry we cannot establish a clear causality between the contingent elements (we can’t say that a sign means what it does because of the previous sign) but we can see a clear connection between the elements and their meanings.  

Sense is generated in the flow of the poem, and if we stop this flow of non-containered signing in the poem we stop the sense of the poem.  All this can explain nicely why it is impossible to segment sign language poetry satisfactorily.  We know it is impossible to write it in English or gloss its individual signs and hope to maintain any of the meaning.

All of which leads us to quantum mechanics.  Obviously it is not exactly like quantum mechanics and what I know about quantum mechanics could be written on the back of a very small postcard, but we can draw analogies with some aspects of it.  For example it proposes that there is variation in the probability that something like a sub-atomic particle (or an element in a meaningful signed utterance) has a given state (or, for us, a given meaning) at a given time (or, for us, in a given poetic context). 

When we mention quantum mechanics, most people (or at least those who watch QI and think they know a bit about these things) think about the Uncertainty Principle and Schrodinger’s Cat – the half-dead and half-alive cat in the box that arises from the idea that measurement of a particle will determine what it is and how it behaves.  Is it a wave or a particle? In the poetic context we can say that we only see the meaning in a particular sign once we have determined the meaning in a previous sign.  And allowing the idea that something can be a wave or a particle until we observe it allows for all the multiple latent meanings in a poem.  If I knew anything about physics beyond ‘O’ level (look up ‘O’ levels, young people; they were, of course, much, much harder than GCSEs are today) I would know how it could be remotely theoretically possible that a single sub-atomic particle could be in more than one place at the same time.  But I do know that in signs in poems can carry with them ambiguities that only need to be resolved at the moment we see them in their poetic context. 

When that hand reaches down to pick up the cochlear implant, the hand is potentially the signer’s and the character’s at the same time; the face is the signer’s face and it is also the cochlear implant’s face and it is also the whole cochlear implant.  It makes being a wave and a particle simultaneously child’s play in comparison.

 (As an aside, we think Nina has revealed the reality of Schrodinger’s Cat Food, in which we observe that you only know if the cat will eat the cat food at the moment you open the packet – until that moment she might or she might not. That's her on the right. We do suspect she's related to Derek Zoolander.)

Quantum mechanics works in the ‘quantum realm’, when things get really small - at the atomic and sub-atomic scale – with the delicious paradox that the larger properties of systems can only be explained by quantum mechanics. (Let’s face it, we all love a delicious paradox.  It’s what gets some of us up in the mornings.)   Michiko Kaneko has been exploring how we have to get right into the make-up of the sign to see how the particles there operate to create poetic meaning as part of signs. So, the overall meaning of the poem can be determined as we decide how to interpret those sub-sign elements (especially handshape but other elements too) but we can only appreciate how those particles generate the meaning once we know what the meaning is.  How's that for recursive?

The ‘quantum’ bit of quantum mechanics comes from the idea that some physical quantities come in discrete amounts, (a quantum is a discrete portion of something we can measure, like in James Bond’s Quantum of Solace) and this contrasts with the idea that they might vary by some arbitrary amount.  I can’t think of a way to measure a ‘discrete packet’ of poetic meaning but the whole idea allows us to have signs made up of apparently non-discrete linguistic items that deliver little pieces of meaning as we look at them (you couldn’t say that the non-container, non-established signs that occur after COCHLEAR-IMPLANT have discrete phonemes).

The other delight of quantum mechanics is that although it tries to explain why matter and energy seem to behave in seriously weird ways once we start thinking at the subatomic level there is still a lot that it can’t explain.  That lets us say that we can think about sign language poetry using this method for as long as it tells us something new and interesting, but we don’t need it to explain the whole thing once and for all.  And nor would we want to.

Dragonflies Draw Flame and A Lily Lilies

I have been horribly remiss in keeping up with my posts but here I am now at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, and I have been thinking some more about poetry, at last, while in this extraordinarily empowering intellectual atmosphere.

Here are some thoughts that came to me while I was at a joint presentation by Josey Foo and Leah Stein about their book A Lily Lilies given at Swarthmore College on 3^rd October. A Lily Lilies combines written poems (by Josey Foo) and notes on dance that go with the poems (by Leah Stein).  Josey said that a person of words needs a dancer in front of them.  A person of spoken words very possibly does; a person of signed words can go some way to being the dancer as well, and I think that is what we see a lot of in signed poetry.

Josey sees her poems as movement poems that use space.  They use space of three types: communal space, individual space and internal space. It is the inter-relation of these, she says, that allows audiences of these dance-poems to feel either that they are watching someone else or that they are watching themselves. Give me a while to get my head around this and I think I will be able to say a lot about these types of space in the signed poems that we have in our anthology, but that is for another day.

For now I want to focus on the similarity between the ways that Navajo and BSL distinguish (or don’t distinguish) nouns and verbs, and the implications this has for thinking about things that ‘do’ and things that ‘be’.  Josey Foo has worked for the Navajo nation for the last 11 years and her collection reflects her knowledge of the Navajo language.  The title poem is called ‘A Lily Lilies’ because, in the Gerard Manley Hopkins sense, what a lily does is what a lily is – it lilies.  Of course, that made me think of all the instances in BSL when that is exactly the case, and also of the lines in As Kingfishers catch Fire ‘What I do is me: For that I came’ (where my dragonflies come from). 

Josey explained that in Navajo one doesn’t sensibly say ‘the sun shines’ because it just is ‘shine’.  We aren’t talking about a thing that does something but rather an action/state that just is. Put another way, the sun is the shine.  She offered the view that ‘eyes’ are a verb in Navajo. If you know BSL that doesn’t seem at all strange and we have much the same thing in most of the ‘looking’ verb signs.  When we have the object so closely intertwined with the action performed by the object in BSL we often can’t separate them. We can’t tell ‘eyes’ from ‘looking’ or ‘looking’ from ‘eyes’; in the normal run of events we won’t separate ‘the sun’ from ‘shining’ or ‘shining’ from ‘the sun’.  All those so-called ‘nouns’ we see as derived from references to objects acting or human interaction with them could be verbs. The same is true for ‘adjectives’ – I suspect it is primarily in our English-speaking imaginations that there are separate signs HIGHLIGHT-WRITTEN-RULES, LAW and LEGAL or BE-SPREAD-OVER-A-LARGE-AREA, NATION and NATIONAL or POUR-FROM-TEST-TUBES, CHEMISTRY and CHEMICAL. Indeed, Dan Slobin has argued that languages like English might force us to separate them, so that we cannot even see that it is meaningless to separate them in a language like BSL. 

When students in my introduction to sign linguistics classes start to think about the relationship between referents and their signs we look at a sign like BRIGHT in relation to a bright light and come to see that it makes as much sense to talk about a sun, sunshine, a sun shining or brightness or just plain bright for the sign we make.

One difference between BSL and Navajo poetry was that Josey was focusing on things that appear to exist independently of us. When she goes inside at dusk, the darkness outside and the horizon cut by her clothes line continue to exist, even though she no longer sees them.  The lily will continue to lily, and the swallow will continue to swallow (that is, to be a swallow or to do being a swallow) whether or not we are there.  In BSL poetry, we know they are still there even when we can’t see them, of course, but the language is happiest showing things as we see them (or once saw them) and as they are part of our world. Sure, they exist independently of us, but we know them best through our interaction with them.  For this reason what we do with our eyes in signs can make a difference to their meaning (which is Christian Cuxac’s really good point).  If we mean to refer to the object (referred to by a noun in English) our eyes are not involved in the meaning of the sign; if we refer to an action whose meaning is related to the human interaction with an object, the eyes will be involved.  

But, as Gerard Manley Hopkins also added, ‘I say more’. When the signer becomes the object through role-shift, the noun and verb take on a whole new relationship to the eyes as, once again, the noun and verb become inseparable – you only know what something is because of what it does and you can only interpret its actions by knowing what it is.

This harks back to something Paul Scott taught me.  He tried to explain to me how signers could take on the role of inanimate entities to show how they communicate.  I was being very dense. I could see how inanimate objects embodied by the signer could sign with any parts that might map on to body parts (an aeroplane can sign with its wings and a tree can sign with its branches) and I could see that they might communicate only by facial expression and head and eye movement if they didn’t have suitable body parts to be recruited for signing (neither an apple nor a spoon has anything protruding that could be a match for hands) but there was something else I couldn’t get, no matter how carefully he explained it. In desperation he grabbed an old envelope and drew on the back for me.           

The speech bubble allows the character to sign using their ‘hands’; in the thought bubble the character is able to show its thoughts through facial expression and head and eye movement; and in that empty space where there is neither speech nor thought bubble the entity communicates by being present as what it is. I finally understood that embodiment allows all referents to communicate by just being.

 In Paul’s poem Too Busy to Hug the mountain does being a mountain, in his poem Tree, the young tree does being a tree. A lily lilies and Paul’s mountain mountains and his tree trees.

 

The presence of absence

Mary Chapin Carpenter says in her despairing song, "It wasn't what you said; it's what you didn't say". In sign language poetry, Michiko Kaneko and I are starting to understand how much poetic meaning comes from referents that aren't shown.

We have been thinking about two examples: The tree in Paul Scott's poem Tree and the knife blade in Johanna Mesch's Party.  Both can be seen at www.bristol.ac.uk/bslpoetryanthology

In Tree, Paul does sign TREE when the seedling grows, but after that the hand that signed TREE shows the ground in which the tree grows.  All sorts of actions occur as people, animals and objects make contact with the tree, even though the tree in not shown. The tree's presence is very strong, and perhaps all the stronger because it isn't there. The illusion is so powerful that I wrote several paragraphs once for a research paper, in which I carefully described the hand showing the tree, before going back for another look and finding the tree wasn't there.  Michiko is quite right when she says that the illusion comes in no small part from the use of the gaze.  Because Paul's eyes are fixed on where the tree should be, we accept that it is there.

Johanna's Party turns on the absence of the presence.  We see the woman holding the knife as she slices the food, through a sign with a handling classifier showing how she handles the knife.  On her other hand she shows a different handling classifier showing how one holds food of that size, shape and consistency (bread, perhaps?). It is clear from the use of space that she is slicing something held by that hand, and that the knife blade is extending from the handle she holds.  Considering how easily we accept this, it is actually quite an extraordinary feat of mental agility.  We simply know that the blade of the knife is there.  But Johanna uses our mental agility against us as we get complacent and simply see what we want to see.  When the woman plunges the hand holding the knife into her chest we naturally assume from the context (the argument with her fiance or husband) that the blade is pointing towards her chest and she aims to commit suicide.  Only alert viewers will notice that she has not turned her hand around.  She rams the knife's handle firmly against her chest but the unseen, absent blade that ought to be so present, is actually pointing away from the body.  Watch it.  It's a classic.

The trick would be impossible in English.

Both poems rely on sign language's  use of empty space to create the poetic effect.

What's the point of knowing what Deaf teachers would do?

I've been working with Deaf teachers recently, learning from them how they work with deaf children, using signed stories in the classroom.  Time and again it comes clear that they know things, can do things, and understand things that can help educate the deaf children in a way that hearing teachers don't seem to be able to do - or at least not so well.

I published the findings with Claire Ramsey at UCSD in the Journal of Deafness and Education International and it seems to have been taken as a wake-up call for better training for hearing people who want to teach deaf children. It is.  Hearing teachers need as much training as possible to help them teach deaf children much better than they can now.  But, even more, it needs to be a wake-up call for better training for deaf people who want to teach deaf children.  Here is the most extraordinary resource that is horribly under-used because of the lack of training.  My friend Paul pointed this out in no uncertain terms.  Thanks Paul.

i-phone

I have been discussing language change and borrowing with my students and we started talking about signs for the i-phone.

Here are some of the signs people came up with (the last one is for the i-pad so it just shows the distinction between the i-phone and the i-pad):

Loans from either English or ASL don't work well.

A direct English calque of "i" plus "phone" works well enough for anyone who is happy to back-translate but visually it doesn't work at all.  I think part of this is because the sign TELEPHONE is old enough to come from the time when it was something hearing people used.  TELEPHONEs are things you put to your ear.  Sure, i-phones can be put to your ear (not that ones sees it that often) but for members of the Deaf commnity the i-phone has no history of being a telephone. It carries none of the baggage of being a barrier to the world of hearing people.  The word 'phone' and the sign TELEPHONE are almost coincidentally linked to the i-phone.

Then there's the 'i' bit.  We can discount wordplay like EYE+PHONE, despite the wide open phonological niche where it could comfortably sit.  There is a proud pedigree of BSL compounds where the first sign is SEE - SEE+MAYBE =CHECK, SEE+NEVER = STRANGE, SEE+SHOW = EXHIBITION, SEE+CATCH = DISCOVER and SEE+SWEAR-THE-TRUTH =WITNESS as just a few examples (there are plenty more in the BSL-English dictionary).  And they all move away from the head and downwards, so that makes the perfect model for EYE+PHONE.  But it's too clever by half.  I+PHONE uses a closer letter-to-meaning link with the 'I' but that won't work as a compound because it moves upwards and in towards the head, and anyway it looks like a verb phrase "I phone [somebody]".

Most prosaically and functionally, then, if we want a calque we can simply fingerspell the -i- and then use PHONE.  Again there is a linguistic niche open as wide as the sky (that's a Dot Miles allusion - watch her poem The Cat) for a manual letter and a sign to create BSL calques from English. We only have to think of -c-WALL (Cornwall), -c-WELL (Camberwell), CAT-f- (Catford) and –c-BRIDGE (Cambridge).  It's all right, but no better than all right.


Maybe the ASL loan could help.  We have a history of borrowing from other sign languages, including ASL, and sometimes we don't even notice it.  Take the sign TREE that most BSL signers today would use.  Not many are aware that it's a loan from ASL. But for the i-phone there's a major clash because the ASL manual letter corresponding to the letter 'i' uses the same handshape as the BSL morpho-phoneme 'bad'.  Thus, instead of a sign that looks like a foreign sign for an i-phone we have a sign that looks like a native sign for a bad phone.


So we give up on loans from any other language and look to a visually motivated sign that doesn't even acknowledge that the i-phone is a telephone.  Why would it, when Deaf people don't use it as a phone anyway?  It is phonologically appropriate; the non-dominant base hand is a flat B hand and doesn't move.  It might be more "visual" if the handshape were a handling classifier to show how one holds an i-phone, but that would be against Battison's dominance and symmetry constraints. So, instead, the handshape is an entity classifier focusing on the flatness of the i-phone.  There is something deliciously elegant about using the open-8 handshape for the dominant hand. A 5 or 1 handshape (or G handshape for old fogeys like me) would do and maybe even be more visually accurate, but would have none of the charm of the open-8.  


How can you not love this language?

(And from what I can make out, the only difference between the signs for an i-phone and an i-pad are in the size of movement)

Anthropomorphism or Zoomorphism in Creative BSL?

Deaf poets and other skilled signers are very good at deliberately giving human characteristics to non-human entities, such as animals or objects.  They also "accidentally" accord human form to things that have non-human forms whenever they engage in roleshift.  Once the poetic signer has shifted role to "become" a dog or a lion or a tree, spoon or street-lamp, all the human physical features of the signer must be mapped on to the new entity at some level.  Even if the signer doesn't mean to accord eyes to a street-lamp, when there is roleshift the signer's eyes will be there, so at some level the street-lamp has eyes.

There are some lovely words for the figurative tropes that represent non-humans as human or humans as non-human.  For the attribution of human qualities to the non-human, there are terms like "anthropomorphism" and "personification", although I confess I find it devilishly hard to find a clear distinction. For some people, the distinction seems to be that giving human form to an abstract concept (i.e. one that has no form at all) is personification and giving human qualities to animate or inanimate objects is anthropomorphism.  Still, this seems a rather arbitrary division when we assume that they all get human form at the end of the process.

The poems I mention here are at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/research/sites/micsl/poems/

It seems to me that there must be something about giving human form to a non-human thing in "anthropomorphism" (if we are to take it etymologically with the "morph" bit meaning "form").  There are different levels of this, though, because as soon as the signer has opted to shift roles and "become" the non-human entity, it has taken on human form simply by virtue of the embodiment.  John Wilson's Home describes how Laika (the first animal to go into orbit) is sent into space and he does not explicitly accord her human form - she's still a dog - but the human body shows the dog's body and the human head shows the dog's head, so at some level Laika is anthropomorphised.  Richard Carter's Mirror has far more human qualities than Laika when he performs the poem, although the form of the mirror is still two-dimensional and square. Richard uses his head, face, eyes and body to accord some human form to the mirror.

Personification as a term might helpfully be reserved for times when the entity is rendered so humanly that you might forget it is not human.  We see this in Paul Scott's Roz; Teach a Dog a New Trick in which Deaf Education is entirely human (a man or a woman?  See my post from 26th November) to the extent that we may not even notice that the ball-thrower is an abstract concept.  But, surely, there are degrees of personification because the key to personification ought to be to keep just enough of the non-human entity present in the personified form to allow it any figurative effect. From what I can make out, personification might be differentiated from anthropomorphisation by its attribution of the power of language to the entity.  Anthropomorphised entities might be able to communicate, but only personified entities can use language (and don't call me Shirley).  Again, there are myriad examples of entities at different places along a continuum for this use of language.  Richard Carter's Reindeer in Snow Globe signs like a reindeer (using remnants of the reindeer's form by signing with its antlers) but the books in Paul Scott's Two Books sign like humans (using completely human form).

"Reification" is another term I have seen used, and occurs when an abstract quality is treated as though it is concrete.  Cued speech, Paget-Gorman Signed speech and oral methods of education are all  abstract concepts but Paul Scott in Macbeth of the Lost Ark has made them into three witches. Eerily, they only have a face and the sign identifying them, but the hands that make the sign itself are human, witch's hands. Thus the sign itself is reified.

Going in the opposite direction, for the de-humanisation of humans there is "zoomorphism" if we are referring to the human in terms of animals. There are also plenty of examples when humans describe themselves in terms of non-humans, for example saying that our batteries are low when we are tired or allowing children to let off steam.  I'm still looking for the word for that.  I do think there must be a word.


Embodying an animate non-human entity might mean that the signer always becomes zoomorphised in some way.

However, there are also plenty of times when the signer will accord animal or other non-human characteristics to a human character.  Paul Scott does this in his poem Roz: teach a Dog a New Trick.  The human Deaf child is represented as a dog in this poem. But, at the same time, there is underlying anthropomorphism here because the dog shows obedience, enthusiasm and resilience and zoologists would claim that these are qualities accorded to a dog through an anthropomorphic "fallacy" or error, as we have no idea if dogs feel these.

So we have a sort of 'Victor Victoria' situation here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Victoria), with the human embodying the character of a dog representing a human, and the human characteristics to be foregrounded are shown as characteristics of a dog.

The same multi-layering is also seen in Richard Carter's 'Birthday' in which the bear that can sign (i.e. an anthropomorphised bear) turns out to be the child's father in a bear-suit (a zoomorphised human).

It's not easy this stuff, but it's great fun.

Gender and translation issues in BSL poetry

This is a bit of a ramble (perhaps I should try the discipline of the 'best bike ride' post and get it into 300 words) but I want to explore some of the issues we've had while working on the poems at www.bristol.ac.uk/bslpoetryanthology

 

We need to consider issues of gender in BSL and English poems for two reasons: firstly for understanding the meaning of the poem in relation to the gender of the poet (“I”) the audience (“you” in English) and other people, characters and entities mentioned in the poem (“she” and “he” in English); and secondly for translating between two languages which have very different needs and expectations in relation to mentioning gender. 

The English pronouns “I” and “you” do not specify gender, and most of the time context will do it for us; face to face we can see the speaker and addressee, and in writing we often know the name of the writer, speaker or addressee, which gives us a clue to their gender.  Poems, though, are often removed from context so they leave more room for interpretation over the gender of the “I” and “you”, especially when they are written because there is more distance between the poet and the reader.  

The written form of English makes these poems less immediately related to the poet, compared to the live “embodied” performance of a signed poem. This effect of assuming that the “I” of a poem is the same gender as the performer is even stronger in the BSL poetry in our anthology than it is in written poetry.  There are poems in our anthology composed and performed by men and women.   All the poems collected are original compositions, performed by their creators, so we know the gender of the real poets: Donna and Johanna are women; Paul, Richard and John are men.  

When they perform their poems, we see their bodies signing so if they say “I” in the poem (for example in Donna Williams’ Who am I) we assume the “I” of the implied poet is also of the poet’s gender.

When they embody a character in the poem, there is a natural tendency for us to assume the character is of the same gender.  The person preparing for the intimate dinner party in Johanna’s poem Party is assumed to be female because Johanna is.  The person stuck in the dream-world in Looking for Diamonds and the person eating the apple in Surprise Apple is assumed to be male because Richard is. (And, in fact, Johanna and Richard have confirmed that they do intend the characters to be a woman and a man, respectively)

Some signed poems clearly have a narrator and some simply start “in character” so we see the story from their viewpoint and actions but they do not necessarily use the pronoun “I”. We are also likely to assume that these narrators or main protagonists are of the same gender as the poet-performer, unless there is something in the performance to make it clear that this is not the case.  Paul clearly tells us that it is a woman shopping for her holiday reading in Two Books (although the gender of the personified books is far less clear), and Johanna’s Son makes it clear that she is shifting between portraying a mother and a son. 

We bring cultural expectations to some of the protagonists.  For example, in Paul Scott’s Doll we know that girls normally play with dolls so we automatically assume that the human in the poem is a girl, but we can’t be sure, and there is an extra element of doubt because Paul, as a man, is signing it. The gender of the protagonist in Richard’s Make-up Theatre is also not clear because, although he is signing it, we assume from the world knowledge that we bring to the poem - and from his performance style - that it is a woman. We have discussed with him whether the character could be a drag queen and he has agreed that it is a possible interpretation but that the characterisation is intended to be that of a woman, no matter how exaggerated it is. 

The problems of identifying the gender behind “I” in signed poems extend to the gender of non-first person. In BSL, it is possible to talk about other people and characters extensively without mentioning their gender.  This is especially relevant for understanding the meaning of poems. Sometimes signing poets deliberately leave the gender of the character vague so that the audience can decide for themselves.  The “lack” of gender in BSL 3^rd-person pronouns is usually no problem and signers barely notice the issue unless they need to clarify it and then they easily do it in many ways (we should note, after all, that English speakers rarely worry about the “lack” of gender in 1^st and 2^nd person pronouns).  But it does become a problem when we try to translate BSL poems into English because when English speakers need to refer to someone else, the language forces them to use gender-specific pronouns – she, he, her, him, hers, his, and so on - and keeping the gender neutral for third person creates very marked (unusual) use of the language.  (We can avoid being specific by using plurals such as “they” and in informal English it is becoming increasingly acceptable to use “they” for a gender-neutral singular form, but generally, the problem remains.) 

Sometimes it is clear from the poem’s context if the character or person being referred to in the poem is male or female.  In Paul’s Three Queens, we know from the title that the three main characters are female; in Macbeth of the Lost Ark, we know the protagonist is male because he must be Macbeth (and we know this is the name of a man) and we know the man at the end is a man because we are told so; in Richard’s Jack in the Box, we know the child is a boy because he repeatedly says “I’m a good boy”.  

Our world knowledge also guides us to interpret genders even when they are not specified in the poem. In Richard’s poem Children’s Park, cultural expectation suggests it is a boy on the swings and a girl skipping, although we cannot be sure. In Paul’s Doll, the fact that dolls are usually thought of as female (pace Barbie’s Ken and G.I. Joe) and the convention that make-up is usually for females allow us to assume the doll is also female.

In Richard’s Looking for Diamonds we probably assume that the implied poet and narrator is a man (mainly because Richard is a man and it is his poem) so our cultural assumptions and knowledge of most typical situations might lead us to think that the person who comes up to him at the end as his true love is a woman.  However, it is perfectly possible from the lack of specification in the poem that the person could be a man (and, indeed, Richard’s portrayal of that character is studiedly neither very masculine nor very feminine – he leaves it to the audience to decide).

The gender of the poet and performer also influences our underlying feelings of the gender of animals. Paul’s Turkey is definitely male because he has a snood, but Richard’s Goldfish and Paul’s Dog (in Teach a Dog a New Trick) feel more likely to be male because men are signing them (is the goldfish gay too? There is nothing in the poem to tell us either way), and Donna’s duckling (in Duck and Dissertation) may be female because Donna is signing it. The gender of the frogs in Richard’s Prince Looking for Love is deliberately ambiguous – who is the prince? Is he one of the frogs?  Are both frogs male or is one female?  If one of each, which one?  (Or is the human the prince?  We might assume from our knowledge of fairy tales that the human is a princess but we are never told the gender of the human, either.)

Even though we know that inanimate objects have no gender, the sex of the performers makes us assume one gender is more likely than the other even for them; Richard’s vain Mirror, the evil Cochlear Implant and the cheerful Deaf Trees are implied somehow to be “male”, Paul’s Mountain and Sea in Too Busy to Hug and the books in Two Books, also feel male (perhaps the books even more so because they are flirting with the woman customer) but Johanna’s Ocean feels more female.

Given these circumstances we are often forced by English to make a gender judgement that we cannot easily – or accurately – make from the BSL poems. We do not want to automatically assume anything. Perhaps

audiences will enjoy playing with the mental images that come from considering the other gender from the one first assumed from seeing the performer.  This will add another layer of appreciation to many of the poems and highlights another special dimension of signed poetry.